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Non-technical Summary 
The role of patents changed fundamentally in the 1990s. The number of patent applications 
increased notably faster than companies’ R&D expenditures, even though companies attrib-
uted a decreased role to patents in protecting innovations. Patents gained a strategic impor-
tance that exceeded their traditional role of appropriating direct returns from R&D. Patenting 
has been motivated by the desire to block competitors in their research activities (blocking 
motive). In addition, patents have become important assets in R&D collaborations, to gener-
ate licensing revenues or to enter cross-licensing agreements (exchange motive). It has been 
assumed that, alongside the traditional protection motive, these additional strategic motives 
have an influence on the characteristics of companies’ patent portfolios. However, no insights 
into this relationship have been available until now. 
This paper analyses whether strategic motives for patenting influence the characteristics of 
companies’ patent portfolios. As first characteristic we use the average number of citations 
that the patents in a portfolio receive. The number of citations can be interpreted as a value 
indicator. The more citations a patent receives from later patent applications the higher its 
value. The second characteristic is the share of patents in a portfolio that receive an opposi-
tion. Within nine months after the grant of a patent by the European Patent Office (EPO), any 
third party can file an opposition against it. In an opposition proceeding the validity of a pat-
ent is checked.  
The investigation is based on survey data from more than 400 German companies that was 
combined with patent information from the EPO. There is evidence that the patenting strate-
gies of companies help to explain the characteristics of their patent portfolios. First, compa-
nies that use patents in their traditional function of protecting innovations from imitation re-
ceive, on average, a higher number of citations for their patents than companies that empha-
sise the more strategic motives of blocking and exchange. Interpreting the number of citations 
as an indicator of value, we find that strategic motives lead to patents of lower value. This 
finding is of great importance to policy makers who are concerned that an increasing number 
of patents of low value may lead to patent thickets that could hinder innovation. Second, we 
find that the motive of offensive blocking but not of defensive blocking is related to a higher 
incidence of oppositions, whereas companies emphasising the exchange motive receive fewer 
oppositions to their patents. Obviously, companies which collaborate in R&D or cross-license 
patents on a regular basis may try to avoid patent conflicts or may prefer to resolve such con-
flicts informally. 
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Abstract 
This paper analyses whether strategic motives for patenting influence the characteristics of 
companies’ patent portfolios. We use the number of citations and oppositions to represent 
these characteristics. The investigation is based on survey and patent data from German com-
panies. We find clear evidence that the companies’ patenting strategies explain the character-
istics of their patent portfolios. First, companies using patents to protect their technological 
knowledge base receive a higher number of citations for their patents. Second, the motive of 
offensive – but not of defensive – blocking is related to a higher incidence of oppositions, 
whereas companies using patents as bartering chips in collaborations receive fewer opposi-
tions to their patents. 
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 1 Introduction 
One phenomenon of the 1990s which was observed in several European countries, but 
also the USA and Japan, was a strong increase in patent applications. At the same time, 
private expenditure on R&D grew only modestly. Consequently, the patent intensity, 
defined as patent applications per unit of R&D expenditure, increased significantly 
(Blind et al. 2004). In this context, several authors (Jaffe, Lerner 2004; Shapiro 2003) 
highlight the innovation-hindering effect of patents. Several explanations for this phe-
nomenon are provided in the literature, although none can claim to be able to explain 
the whole story (Jaffe 1999). First, it is argued that the R&D process became more effi-
cient or more differentiated by a further division of labour, leading to a higher number 
of inventions and therefore of patents per unit of R&D expenditure (Janz et al. 2001). 
Second, patent applications have been extended to promising and expanding new fields 
of technology (Kortum, Lerner 1999), like biotechnology (e.g. Thumm 2003) and soft-
ware (e.g. Blind et al. 2005). Third, patent strategies have changed and became more 
complex and comprehensive, leading to an expansion of patent applications (Blind et al. 
2004). 
The first explanation does not provide a source for concern and the second involves 
external technological or political forces, which cannot be dealt with in one single pa-
per. Accordingly, our analysis focuses on the third. A number of previous studies pre-
sent structures and the extent of strategic patenting (Arundel et al. 1995; Cohen et al. 
2002; Schalk et al. 1999). They argue that the patent system, the original purpose of 
which is the temporary protection of a company’s the technological knowledge base, is 
used by companies for various further so called “strategic” motives. For example, pat-
ents are also an instrument for securing one’s own future technological space against 
competitors or for restricting their future technological opportunities. In recent years, 
patents have become important assets in collaborations, to generate licensing revenues 
or to get better access to the capital market, especially for start-up companies. Finally, 
patents can also be used by companies’ management as a performance indicator and 
even linked to reward schemes for researchers. 
Parallel to the emerging literature on strategic patenting, numerous authors have con-
centrated on the analysis of indicators to determine the economic value of patents. In 
bibliographic analyses, the number of citations is accepted as a reliable value indicator. 
It can be successfully transferred to patents.1 Furthermore, the incidence of patent oppo-
sitions is a good signal that a patent is valuable. Several studies have looked into both 
                                                 
1 See Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) for a comprehensive overview. 
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 the interrelationship of the various value indicators and their explanatory power for the 
monetary value of patents (Harhoff et al. 2003; Harhoff, Reitzig 2004; Lanjouw, Schan-
kerman 2004; Traijtenberg 1990). 
In our paper, we try for the first time to bridge the gap between the research on strategic 
patenting and investigations into companies’ patent portfolios. Additionally, we focus 
explicitly on the characteristics of a company’s portfolio and not on single patents. We 
extend the systematic analysis of factors explaining the motives of strategic patenting in 
Germany by Blind et al. (2006). Our aim is to investigate the relationship between stra-
tegic patenting and the characteristics of companies’ patent portfolios, measured by 
various value indicators. This paper is based on survey data collected by Blind et al. 
(2003) for a sample of almost 500 patenting companies in Germany. It presents insights 
into the influence of strategic patenting on the characteristics of companies’ patent port-
folios, like the number of citations per patent or the likelihood of oppositions. 
Using this comprehensive database, we perform numerous multivariate regressions 
leading to the following insights. There is strong evidence that the motive structure af-
fects the results of the patent examination process, i.e. references to other patent claims, 
or the opposition behaviour of other applicants. We find that the more intensively com-
panies use patents to achieve the protection objective, the higher is the average number 
of citations their patent portfolio receives. Conversely, in cases where strategic motives, 
such as blocking and exchange, dominate, portfolios receive less citations and are hence 
of lower value on average. Furthermore, our results show that the incidence of opposi-
tion against a company’s portfolio is higher when the company assesses the offensive 
blocking motive as important. This implies that competitors also perceive this motiva-
tion and are more likely to react with disputes against those companies. Simultaneously, 
companies that regard their patent motives mostly as driven by cooperation and ex-
change goals are faced with proportionally fewer oppositions to patents in their portfo-
lios than companies using patents mainly for protective reasons. These insights allow us 
also to derive recommendations for future patent policy. Markets for technology are 
obviously rather efficient in the sense of information efficiency, since companies using 
patents as bartering chips possess patent portfolios of similar characteristics. The phe-
nomenon of frequent oppositions and rather limited citations in a company’s patent 
portfolio is an indicator for the implementation of an offensive blocking strategy. Such 
a strategy could lead to “patent thickets”, generating higher costs for innovating com-
petitors. Whether policy makers should react to this anticompetitive behaviour depends 
on the extent of these thickets and their implications for further inventions. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we discuss several 
patenting motives. In Chapter 3, we present the most relevant indicators for measuring 
the value of patents. In Chapter 4 we develop a set of hypotheses for the empirical in-
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 vestigation of the relationship between the different strategic motives for patenting and 
the characteristics of patent portfolios. Chapter 5 presents the merged database we use 
for our empirical analysis and some descriptive statistics. In Section 6, the results of a 
series of regressions are displayed and used to validate or revise the hypotheses devel-
oped in Chapter 4. The paper concludes with a summary of results and challenges for 
future research. 
2 Motives to Patent 
Different approaches can be taken to classify strategic motives to patent. The basic 
function of a patent as originally intended by the architects of the patent system is to 
provide an effective instrument to prevent imitation by competitors, in order to secure 
the appropriability of the earnings from innovative technologies. If this is achieved, pat-
ents should also increase the incentive to invest in innovative activities. However, the 
existence of the patent system also creates opportunities to use these patents for differ-
ent purposes. Therefore, the motives for patenting vary among patentees. There is no 
agreed definition of strategic patenting, although most experts include the use of patents 
to block competitors and the use of patents in negotiations with other companies. 
Arundel and Patel (2003) divide these strategic (in contrast to traditional) reasons into 
defensive and offensive strategies. A firm will patent defensively in order to stop other 
firms from patenting one of its inventions and suing it for infringement, even though the 
firm does not need a patent on the invention to earn a return on its investments in inno-
vation.2 These approaches refer mainly back to the function of patents to block other 
market participants from using technologies which are protected by patents but not nec-
essarily used in business. This strategy can be intended from the beginning of the patent 
application process or can emerge from the fact that certain patents are not worth ex-
ploiting but only used to build a protected area around other patents of the company. 
Firms patent offensively to prevent or block other firms from patenting inventions that 
are similar, but not identical, to the invention that they plan to commercialise. In this 
case, the firm builds a much broader patent wall – compared to defensive patenting – 
around its invention. This prevents other firms from commercialising competing prod-
                                                 
2 The returns derived from non-patent appropriation methods such as secrecy or lead-time advantages, 
which are also defensive in character, have consistently been shown in innovation surveys to be 
more valuable to firms than patents (Arundel et al. 1995; Cohen et al. 2000; Granstrand 1999). For 
analyses of the relationship between patenting and secrecy see for example Arundel (2001) and 
Hussinger (2006). 
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 ucts, even though the firm does not intend to market or license these other products it-
self. 
Furthermore, firms may choose to patent defensively in order to have something to 
trade with other firms. In some sectors, such as ICT, the use of patents in negotiations 
with other firms for technology access is probably one of the most important motives 
for patenting (Hall, Ziedonis 2001). This trading or cooperation argument is strength-
ened by Noel and Schankerman (2006) who found that a large patent portfolio enhances 
the bargaining power of a company. Negotiations about mergers, license contracts, or 
research co-operations depend mainly on how the partners evaluate the research efforts 
and results of their partners which is mainly measured in the number of patents in the 
companies’ portfolio.  
In the empirical literature, Blind et al. (2006) are able to divide the various motives for 
patenting into the traditional protection motive, the blocking motive, the reputation mo-
tive, the exchange motive, and the motive to use patents as incentives and as perform-
ance indicators for R&D departments and employees. This distinction is based on a fac-
tor analysis, which condenses the complex multiplicity of motives in a meaningful man-
ner. The groups generated by the factor analysis correspond very well to the motive 
clusters discussed in the literature. 
3 Patent Portfolio Characteristics 
Patents are heterogeneous in their value and function for their owners and supply differ-
ent levels of additional profit to companies through the original protection function and 
strategic functions (Somaya 2003). The value a single patent has for its patentee is not 
observable. Even the absolute value of patent portfolios or patent stocks is hard to iden-
tify from survey data (Harhoff et al. 2003). In this section, we present the most reliable 
value indicators which can be used to describe the characteristics of a company’s patent 
portfolio. We use the concept of the private value of the patented invention for the com-
pany. At this point we do not follow the general, long-lasting and still open discussion 
of the value of the patent rights as such compared to no patent at all. Besides the private 
value concept there is also a social value. However, we do not consider social value in 
our analysis. 
At the European Patent Office (EPO) the examiner makes the ultimate decision on what 
patents will be included as references (backward citations) to the prior art related to the 
invention. The patent applicant may suggest patents which should be included as refer-
ences. The references to earlier patents in the German and European patent system mark 
the boundaries of patentability and the basis the invention builds on. They are used to 
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 substantiate the patentability for which novelty and inventive activity are necessary. 
This function of citations implies that the number of citations received (forward cita-
tions) play a similar role to that of references in scientific publications as an indicator 
for the importance of the patent. Traijtenberg (1990) strongly supports this argument 
and Harhoff et al. (2003) provide broader evidence of the correlation between patent 
value and citations received in subsequent patent applications. However, one has to 
mention that citations can point to further technological development and a possible 
depreciation of the invention.  
In addition to the number of citations, the incidence of an opposition is also a positive 
value indicator. Opposition is the first dispute about the validity of a granted patent. 
Any third party can file an opposition within nine months after a patent has been grant-
ed when there are reasons such as doubts as to novelty, doubts over a sufficient inven-
tive step or when there might be pre-granting use of the invention prior to the patent 
application. The procedure is relatively cheap compared to a litigation procedure. How-
ever, there is no direct communication between the patentee and the opposer. This is 
different to a litigation procedure before a civil court. The rationale behind opposition is 
that the expected value of the protected invention is so high that it is worthwhile for 
competitors to oppose the patent in order to prevent or restrict the patentee’s intellectual 
property right. Expected innovation rents for patents which withstood opposition proce-
dures either amended or unchanged are proved to be higher than for non-opposed pat-
ents (Harhoff et al. 2006). This finding is strengthened by the analysis by Harhoff and 
Reitzig (2004), which shows that opposed EPO patents in biotechnology and pharma-
ceuticals are generally more valuable than those which were not opposed, based on 
measurements using several value indicators. On the one hand, a higher expected value 
of a patent attracts more interest from those who would wish to exploit that value. On 
the other hand, a patent which has faced and survived opposition becomes more valu-
able because survival indicates a stronger patent right. The fact that a patentee faces an 
opposition is a signal from potential or actual competitors. It reveals that the invention 
has been recognized to be relevant for other actors in the market and that they take the 
patent seriously. The result of those oppositions can be a rejection of the opposition or 
an amendment of the patent, both of which are considered to improve the quality of the 
patent. Amendments in the sense of restrictions to the original claims are also regarded 
as a quality check (Graham et al. 2003). 
In the literature there are further indicators proved to be correlated with the value of the 
patent. In addition to the citation and opposition measure used in our empirical analysis, 
for completeness, the following four indicators have to be mentioned: references, family 
size (Putnam 1996), number of claims and routes of patent protection. 
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 4 Hypotheses 
We focus on three main clusters of patenting motives and relate these to the selected 
indicators for the value of companies’ patent portfolios: the original protection motive, 
the blocking motive and the exchange motive. The blocking motive is further divided 
into defensive and offensive blocking. Due to the special research questions of our 
analysis this structure is different from that used by Blind et al. (2006). The exchange 
motive is defined in a narrower sense by just focusing the use of patents for cross-
licensing, for earning licensing revenues and to improve the company’s own position in 
co-operations with other companies. 
In order to analyse the influence of the various motives to patent on the value of the 
patented innovation we explain the average number of citations per patent in compa-
nies’ patent portfolios by the expressed priorities of the companies’ patenting motives. 
If the protection of the technological knowledge base via patenting is very important 
compared to the strategic motives to patent, we can assume that the protected know-how 
is rather valuable, which should be reflected in a higher number of citations of the pat-
ents. A similar argument is valid for the motive of securing market share via patenting. 
In contrast, the research and development activities of competitors can be blocked by 
patents of rather mediocre quality. Furthermore, blocking competitors is more success-
ful if competitors are confronted with a higher number of patents claiming different 
aspects of the same technology. Consequently, the average quality of patents is likely to 
be lower if they are used to implement a blocking strategy.  
In addition, the intention to block relates to future technological fields which may or 
may not be as valuable as anticipated. The uncertainty increases even further if a com-
pany applies for patents based on speculations about the possible future technological 
trajectories of its competitors, as in the case of offensive blocking. Defensive blocking 
is concentrated on the technological fields which are very close to the core technologi-
cal area of the company and is therefore less speculative. Consequently, the quality of 
the patents should be closer to that of patents applied for in order to secure the actual 
knowledge base.  
We are not convinced by the argument that patents applied for in order to block com-
petitors receive a smaller number of citations, since competitors are completely deterred 
from the relevant technological field. Technologies have become more complex and 
numerous single components are necessary to construct a single final product or system. 
Consequently, patents on a specific type of technology for a single component do not 
reduce the attractiveness of patenting an alternative technology with similar functional-
ities, which may be the basis for a competing component. Such simultaneous innovation 
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 and patenting activities are very frequent in more complex industries, e.g. information 
technology (Varian et al. 2004). 
Patents are not only used to block competitors in the market. They are also important 
instruments for collaborations with companies in both the vertical and horizontal market 
dimensions. Hall and Ziedonis (2001) show that patents allow a further differentiation 
of the value chain by promoting the division of work in the semi-conductor industry 
between rather small companies developing the blueprints of new technologies and 
rather large manufacturers owning production capacities and distribution systems. Fur-
thermore, patents are playing an increasing role for collaboration at the horizontal level, 
since the increasing complexity of products, e.g. in the information and telecommunica-
tion industry, requires the use of a variety of technologies, which even large multina-
tionals cannot efficiently invent and develop. Several studies support the positive rela-
tionship between participation in R&D co-operation and patenting activities (Peeters, 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2006) there is no information available about the value 
of the patent portfolios of companies involved in co-operations, licensing or cross-
licensing. In general, companies have to signal that they possess a rather large patent 
portfolio in order to get access to important co-operations or cross-licensing arrange-
ments. Therefore, similarly to the patent portfolios of companies using patents for 
blocking reasons this size incentive has negative implications for the value of the aver-
age patent. Furthermore, there is a potential information asymmetry between the patent 
owners and possible co-operation partners and licensees about the quality of the pat-
ented technology, which may be exploited by the former.  
Different mechanisms work on markets with information asymmetries between the sup-
ply and the demand side. On the supply side signalling strategies could be used, i.e. 
publishing the names of other licensees or even the citations of their patents. For exam-
ple, various agencies managing patent pools publish the names of the licensees. Regard-
ing the demand side, companies that use patents extensively as assets in the exchange 
with other actors have to expect that their collaborators or contract partners will analyse 
in depth the quality of the patents they are interested in. Consequently, low-quality pat-
ent applications might be detected and generate a negative reputation for their owners, 
which might also be perceived by other possible collaboration partners.3 If companies 
assume a tendency towards efficient technology markets with very low information 
asymmetries, then companies interested in collaborations are expected to produce pat-
ents of a quality, which are not different to those patents foreseen for the implementa-
tion in own products, but even of higher quality, which should be reflected in above 
                                                 
3 Sine et al. (2003) analyse the role of reputation for the licensing success of universities. 
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 average citation rates. However, if collaboration partners do not have the competencies 
to detect the quality of patent portfolios or if collaboration is rather short term and col-
laboration partners change often, then we might observe fewer citations of patents from 
the portfolios of those companies using patents as assets in exchange processes. In our 
arguments, we highlight the incentive to produce at first a large patent portfolio and 
treat the still existing information asymmetry or moral hazard problem as given but not 
decisive. This is in line with new insights of Noel and Schankerman (2006) who find 
that bargaining power is considerably enhanced by the pure stock of the patents, even 
though the discussion about the valuation of patents as bargaining chips is growing. 
Taking these arguments we derive the following hypothesis:4
H1: The average value of patents in a company’s portfolio, measured in terms of the 
average number of citations of the patent portfolio, will be  
a) high, when the motive of protection is important in the company’s patent strat-
egy, 
b) low, when the motive of blocking competitors’ inventions is important in the 
company’s patent strategy, 
c) low, when the motive of exchange and collaboration is important in the com-
pany’s patent strategy. 
A further characteristic of a patent portfolio is the share of oppositions received by pat-
ents in the portfolio of a company. Regarding the motives for patenting we have out-
lined, companies using patents to protect their valuable technological know-how, should 
expect on the one hand that oppositions from competitors will be more likely, because 
the rather valuable asset will generate a disadvantage for the competitor. On the other 
hand, if their patents are of high quality and possible opponents are aware of it, then 
opposition makes no sense. This argument depends on the predictability of the opposi-
tion process, i.e. the opponents can predict the outcome of the opposition process ex 
ante based on the objective quality of the opposed patent. 
                                                 
4 The following hypotheses can also be derived based on the simple optimisation of the profit of a 
company's profit by using the patent quality as decision variable. In contrast to choosing the optimal 
patent quality for securing the technological know-how for the internal use, producing patents for 
blocking competitors is characterised by higher costs due to the distance to the own technological 
core competencies, which leads to a relatively lower patent quality. If companies apply for patents 
as assets in exchange relations, the information asymmetries in the markets for technological know-
how create incentives to produce patents of lower quality compared to the quality of patents to be 
used for internal use.   
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 Compared to companies using patents to protect their own technological knowledge 
base, companies using patents explicitly as an instrument to block competitors in their 
competition strategies will receive a more critical feedback from competitors. Since the 
technological space and future market opportunities of the competitors will be deprived 
by these kinds of patents, they have a higher incentive to invest in opposing these kinds 
of applications. Furthermore, the chance of a successful opposition is higher due to the 
expectation that a blocking company has more low quality patents in its portfolio, for 
which the probability of opposition is higher. Consequently, we should expect a higher 
likelihood of opposition for the whole portfolio.  
The motivation to use patents as assets in exchange processes, i.e. to generate licensing 
revenues, to use them in cross-licensing or for improving the position in co-operations, 
is based on a fairly collaborative strategy. Consequently, these companies apply for pat-
ents that improve their attractiveness as a co-operation or contract partner. Compared to 
using patents simply for the protection of the company’s own technological know-how 
or even for blocking competitors, this strategy should not generate oppositions from 
other companies. Similarly, if these companies are important players in various co-
operations, their partners are likely to solve possible disputes internally and not via rais-
ing oppositions. Based on these considerations, we derive the second hypothesis: 
H2: The probability of an opposition against patents in a company’s portfolio is  
a) high, when the motive of protection is important in the company’s patent strat-
egy, 
b) high, when the blocking motive is important in the company’s patent strategy, 
c) low, when the motive of exchange and collaboration is important in the com-
pany’s patent strategy. 
Generally, we argue that a motivation structure of patenting companies which tend to 
include more strategic elements shifts the characteristics of the portfolio towards a less 
valuable portfolio in the sense of citations. The incidence of opposition is also influ-
enced by these motives.  
5 Description of Data 
Our analysis is based on the combination of survey information on companies’ patent-
ing motives with information on their patent portfolio. All German companies which 
had applied for a minimum number of three patents in 1999 – more than 1500 in total – 
were contacted via a paper questionnaire in the year 2002 (Blind et al. 2003). The sur-
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 vey achieved a high response rate of over 33% and thus over 500 completed question-
naires were received.5 The companies participating in the survey are responsible for 
more than 40% of all German applications at the European Patent Office for the year 
1999. The survey thus covers a high share of very large, actively patenting companies. 
The sample comprises very large and very small companies with an average number of 
employees of 6,374 and a median of 517 employees. The companies which had an-
swered the survey were then identified in the patent data of the European Patent Office. 
This was done via a string search comparing company name and address with the appli-
cant information in the EPO data. The results of the search then underwent a thorough 
manual plausibility check. After removing observations with insufficient company in-
formation, we end up with a sample of 457 companies for which we have combined 
information on motives and EPO patents. 
Now to a brief description of the construction of the motive structure we applied as ex-
planatory variables. Originally, the patenting motives are taken from the company sur-
vey. Respondents were asked to rate the motives on a five-point scale from 1 for not 
important to 5 for very important. In order to collate the information about the motives 
we grouped them into the three categories (protection, blocking, exchanging). As we 
regarded the protection of innovation and market shares as the original protection mo-
tive, we decided through the correlation structure in Table 1 that those original variables 
should be transformed into one variable, the protection motive. It is calculated as the 
average assessment of all answers in this group. The offensive blocking motive is de-
fined as preventing competitors from application of technological developments and 
was taken directly from assessments of the questionnaires. Defensive blocking of com-
petitors is securing leeway to develop one’s own technology without using the patents 
commercially. Again, this variable is taken directly from the questionnaire. The third 
block of motives – the exchange motives – is used as the average assessment of the mo-
tives income from licensing, use for cross-licensing, and cooperation. 
Descriptive statistics relating to our dataset can be found in Table 2. We define two de-
pendent variables to describe average characteristics of the patents contained in the port-
folio. Our first characteristic is the average number of citations.6 Patents receive cita-
                                                 
5 The large majority (more than 85%) of the persons who filled in the questionnaire are involved in 
the strategic issues of patenting (CEO, patent department) and not in the purely technical aspects 
(R&D manager, engineers). This supports the validity of the answers. Only 13% of the responses 
came from persons representing the R&D department. 
6 We thank Dietmar Harhoff from the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich for making the 
citation data available to us. A detailed description of the citation data can be found in Harhoff et al 
(2006). 
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 tions over a very long period of time, which makes older patents on average more heav-
ily cited. To avoid an influence of the age of the patents in the portfolio, we only con-
sider the citations that a patent receives in the first five years after the EPO published 
the search report for the patent. On average, a patent receives 0.73 citations including 
self-citations, i.e. citations by other patents of the same company. The phenomenon of 
opposition is captured by the share of patents that were opposed. This variable indicates 
that 4 percent of all patents are opposed. 
Table 1: Correlation Structure of the Motives 
 
Imit. 
prot. 
M. 
share, 
national 
M. 
share, 
Europe 
M. 
share, 
excl. 
Eur. 
Off. 
Block. 
Def. 
block. 
Lic. 
income 
Cross-
licensing Coop. 
Imitation pro-
tection 1.00         
Market share, 
national 0.39* 1.00        
Market share, 
Europe 
0.35* 0.65* 1.00       
Market share, 
excl. Europe 
0.21* 0.33* 0.69* 1.00      
Offensive 
blocking 
0.38* 0.26* 0.28* 0.26* 1.00     
Defensive 
blocking 
0.23* 0.21* 0.25* 0.28* 0.24* 1.00    
Income from 
licencing 
0.04 0.12* 0.17* 0.23* 0.06 0.04 1.00   
Use for cross-
licencing 
-0.02 0.01 0.08 0.18* 0.02 0.17* 0.47* 1.00  
Cooperation 0.04 0.18* 0.20* 0.22* 0.06 0.20* 0.51* 0.50* 1.00 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5%-level. 
As an intermediate measure of patent value we use the companies’ relevance assessment 
of the strategy of applying for patents in increasingly smaller steps. This was asked 
about using a five-point scale. We use a coding from 1 for companies that do not agree 
with the strategy to 5 for companies that agree. We interpret this as a strategy which 
leads to “thinner” patents with less scope than those with larger steps. Furthermore, pat-
enting in smaller steps leads to less complex and hence less valuable patents within the 
portfolio. This smaller step strategy is the opposite of another strategy which has also 
been pursued in recent years, where the number of claims per patent grew and therefore 
a higher complexity of the patents can be assumed. This leads us to the assumption that 
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 an explicit application strategy of patenting in small steps is incorporated to reach cer-
tain goals in building large portfolios or creating fences around core innovations, but 
that this goes against the trend of creating highly complex patents. Companies evaluate 
this small step strategy on average with 2.96 on a 1 to 5 scale. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean Median s.d. Min Max 
Dependent Variables      
Citations 0.73 0.65 0.56 0 4 
Share opposition 0.04 0.00 0.08 0 1 
Patenting in smaller 
steps 2.96 3 1.31 1 5 
Motives      
Imitation protection 3.95 4.0 0.82 1 5 
Defensive blocking 3.99 4 0.96 1 5 
Offensive blocking 3.85 4 1.04 1 5 
Exchange 2.46 2.33 1.07 1 5 
Company Classifica-
tion      
Dummy defensive 
blocking company 0.40 0 0.49 0 1 
Dummy offensive 
blocking company 0.07 0 0.26 0 1 
Dummy exchange 
company 0.05 0 0.22 0 1 
Control Variables      
Portfolio size    (patent 
applications with prior-
ity '91-'00) 
114 15 631 1 9,534 
 
The average values of the motive clusters show rather pronounced differences in the 
importance of the motive clusters. It ranges from a high of 3.99 for defensive blocking 
to a low of 2.46 for the average of the exchange motives, whereas the blocking motives 
taken together reach an average assessment of 3.92. Offensive blocking is slightly less 
important than defensive blocking (3.85 compared to 3.99). We assume that in cases 
where the average evaluation of a certain motive is higher that there is a higher share of 
patents which are applied for according to this motive. 
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 In addition, we use dummy variables to classify the companies into four types according 
to their evaluation of the protection, defensive blocking, offensive blocking and ex-
change motive. Companies that give the protection motive a higher valuation than the 
remaining three motives constitute the basis category. The dummy for a defensive 
blocking company takes the value of one if this motive has the highest value and is zero 
otherwise. The dummies for offensive blocking and exchange company are defined 
analogously. 
For the characteristics of the patent portfolios we consider patents that were applied for 
in the time period 1991-2000.7 On average the companies hold 114 patents, while the 
median is only 15. This indicates a skewness of the distribution also found in other stud-
ies. We include dummies to control for the technology to which the majority of a com-
pany’s patents belong. 48.9% of companies have a focus on mechanical technologies, 
22.2% on electronics, 14.1% on chemicals, 5.5% on pharmaceuticals and 9.3% on other 
technologies.  
A further description of the motive relevance among the patentees is given in Table 3. 
The upper panel shows how the motive evaluation is distributed over technology classes 
in which the companies mainly patent. 
The variation among the technological fields is not considerable except in the case of 
chemicals. Here a higher valuation of all patenting motives reflects the higher reliance 
of this technology on patents. The lower panel of Table 3 displays that companies of 
different sizes vary in their evaluation of the motives. Especially very small and very 
large companies assign more importance to the exchange motive than medium-sized 
companies. 
 
                                                 
7 The results remain almost identical when we choose the time period 1996-2000. We assume that the 
characteristics of companies’ patent portfolios are quite stable over time, which allows us to explain 
them with the company characteristics and motive assessments given in the year 2002. 
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 Table 3: Importance of Motives by Technological Area and Company Size, 
Means  
 Protection 
Motive 
Blocking 
Motive 
Exchange 
Motive 
Number of 
Observation 
Technological Area 
Pharmaceuticals 3.94 3.90 2.52 29 
Chemicals 4.23 4.15 3.18 66 
Electronics 3.85 3.77 2.59 102 
Mechanical 3.93 3.95 2.23 224 
Other  3.85 3.81 2.22 36 
Number of Employees 
1 – 100 4.00 3.90 2.71 95 
101 – 1000 3.95 3.96 2.17 193 
1001 – 5000 3.88 3.83 2.44 104 
> 5000 3.96 3.99 3.02 65 
Total 3.95 3.92 2.46 457 
 
6 Results and Interpretation 
In our empirical analysis we investigate how the average value of the patents in a com-
pany’s portfolio and the incidence of opposition are related to the patenting motives of 
the company. In separate regressions, presented in Tables 4 and 6, we shed light on the 
direct relationship between several patenting motives and the patent portfolio character-
istics. We apply a Tobit model in order to take into account the fact that more than 10 
percent of the companies do not receive any citations. A similar pattern is observed for 
the opposition equation where the share of portfolios without any opposition is about 50 
percent. The standard errors are estimated robustly in all equations. 
Table 4 displays the regression results that are relevant for hypothesis 1, which seeks to 
explain differences in the average citations of companies’ patent portfolios. In columns 
(1) to (4) we use the average valuation of each motive as the explanatory variable in 
separate equations. If we use these average relevance assessments of the four clusters of 
motives (column (5)), we can confirm hypothesis 1a), namely that the more intensively 
companies use patents to achieve the protection objective, the higher is the average 
number of citations their patent portfolio receives (see also column (1)). However, we 
could not find significant support for hypotheses 1b) and 1c) using the average rele-
vance assessment approach. The results of these separate regressions are shown in col-
umn (2) to (4). 
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 Table 4: Tobit Regressions Explaining Average Number of Citations 
 (Marginal Effects) 
Citations 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Imitation protection 0.074** 
(0.029) 
   0.081*** 
(0.029) 
 
Defensive blocking  0.009 
(0.026) 
  -0.011 
(0.026) 
 
Offensive blocking   0.006 
(0.023) 
 -0.015 
(0.022) 
 
Exchange    0.030 
(0.026) 
0.023 
(0.026) 
 
Dummy defensive 
blocking company 
     -0.071 
(0.055) 
Dummy offensive 
blocking company 
     -0.104* 
(0.062) 
Dummy exchange 
company 
     -0.321**
(0.140) 
Portfolio size 0.126*** 
(0.016) 
0.130***
(0.016) 
0.131***
(0.016) 
0.125***
(0.017) 
0.123*** 
(0.017) 
0.133***
(0.016) 
No of observations 457 457 457 457 457 457 
Log pseudo-
likelihood -389 -392 -392 -389 -388 -388 
Note: Marginal effects and their robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, 1% significance level. The regressions contain dummies for five technology classes and for 
four categories of company age. 
In our first hypothesis, we state that companies that use patents to block competitors 
have patent portfolios of lower value. However, we differentiate further between offen-
sive and defensive blocking strategies: we contend that the latter will lead to patents of 
higher value while the former will produce rather mediocre patents. The equation in 
column (5) integrates all average motive evaluations. Therefore we control for the abso-
lute importance of patenting within the company which changes the results regarding 
the blocking motives, i.e. additional emphasis on using patents for blocking competitors 
now has a negative, but insignificant impact on the value of companies’ portfolios.  
An alternative approach is to construct dummy variable for specific types of companies. 
In column (6) we classify companies as having an overall tendency towards protecting, 
defensive blocking, offensive blocking, or exchanging. This dummy approach reveals 
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 conclusively that companies’ patents receive fewer citations when it is an offensive 
blocking company or a company using patents in exchange relations with other compa-
nies. We can thus confirm hypothesis 1b) and c). The results of the Tobit regression in 
column (6) reveal emphatically that the patent portfolios of both companies using pat-
ents to block competitors offensively and those using them as bartering chips in the in-
teractions with other companies receive significantly less citations on average for their 
patent portfolios compared to the companies employing patents to protect their own 
technological know-how.  
In all three regression approaches, we find a significant positive influence of the portfo-
lio size on the value indicator citations. The positive influence of the portfolio size on 
citations is a clear indication of economies of scale or even learning curves in the pro-
duction of patents, which ultimately also leads to patents of higher value. 
Summarising and interpreting the results of the regressions in order to explain the cita-
tions of companies’ portfolios, we come to the following conclusion. The patent portfo-
lios of companies that generally use patents to protect their technologies are of higher 
value than those of firms which try to block their competitors by strategic behaviour. 
This result exactly reflects our hypothesis one. In addition, we find a difference between 
the portfolio values of companies using patents for offensive and defensive purposes. 
This difference can be explained by the argument that defensive blocking leads to pat-
ents which are closely related to the already existing patent portfolio of the companies. 
Additionally, these patents already take future protection needs into account. Conse-
quently, these patents benefit positively from the actual research activities and are very 
similar to patents applied to protect the current technological base. In contrast patents 
used for offensive blocking are of less technological value, since they are not able to 
benefit to the same extent from positive synergies with a firm’s current research. 
Furthermore, the average value of patents in the portfolios of companies using patents 
for their original purpose is also significantly higher than the average value of patents in 
portfolios of companies using patents to generate licensing revenues, as bartering chips 
in cross-licensing arrangements or in negotiations with other companies in co-
operations. This result confirms our hypothesis 1c), but it is also an important indication 
that information inefficiencies still exist in markets for technology. As already argued 
above, portfolio size is an important indicator for those engaged in using patents in li-
censing and co-operation, which may also lead to the lower-value patent applications. 
However, our results indicate that there must still be a significant information problem 
in the market for technologies. In perfect markets, the competitive pressure on those 
trading patents should be so high that offering patents of lower value will be punished 
by significant damage to the reputation of the supplying company. Since we have to 
assume that collaborations in R&D tend to have more of a medium- and long-term per-
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 spective rather than being short-term engagements, damage to the reputation of technol-
ogy providers should be detrimental for their future perspectives in the licensing market 
and for their position in collaborations. However, this competitive pressure is not yet 
reflected in our regression results. 
As an additional approach we look at whether the application behaviour of the patentees 
is influenced by the motives they cite as relevant (Table 5). In an ordered probit regres-
sion we can confirm that the complexity of patent applications measured in the higher 
share of patent applications in smaller steps, is significant smaller when the patentee 
evaluates the offensive blocking as very important. It is also evident that for cooperation 
and exchange, patenting in smaller steps accounts for a larger proportion of the patents 
in the portfolio. That indirectly supports the first hypotheses, i.e. that strategic goals of 
patenting such as blocking and exchange lead to less complex and hence less valuable 
patents, on average. 
Regarding the second hypothesis focusing on the likelihood of oppositions, measured 
by the share of patents in a portfolio that are opposed, we apply the same regression 
models as presented in Table 4. Again, the relevance assessment of the protection mo-
tive has a significant impact on the probability of opposition which may point to a 
higher incidence of opposition for more valuable patents but also indicates that protec-
tion of technological know-how is a serious competitive strategy, which is likely to be 
answered by oppositions on the part of competitors (Table 6). Using the average evalua-
tion of the other motives either solely or in the integrated equation does not reveal any 
significant relationship between the defensive blocking motivation and opposition 
against the companies’ portfolios. The same holds for the exchange motive. However, 
we find a significant correlation between offensive blocking and the likelihood that a 
portfolio will face opposition (column (3)). The regression in column (5) considers this 
phenomenon as well. We can partly confirm hypothesis 2b), since especially aggressive 
offensive patenting provokes oppositions, whereas defensive blocking is not more likely 
to encourage oppositions from competitors than just protecting the actual technological 
base. Simple defensive blocking strategies may only lead to opposition, if the competi-
tors behave rather aggressively, because both the incentives to oppose and the chances 
of successful opposition are lower than in the case of offensive patents, because the lat-
ter do not originate from the core of companies’ technological bases. Using the inte-
grated equation with all motives explaining the likelihood of opposition, the effect of 
the protection motive vanishes and becomes insignificant.  
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 Table 5: Ordered Probit Regressions Explaining Patent Applications in 
Smaller Steps 
Smaller Steps 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Imitation protection 0.094 
(0.054)    
0.015 
(0.070) 
Defensive blocking 
 0.089 (0.054)   
0.051 
(0.057) 
Offensive blocking 
  0.113** (0.050)  
0.098* 
(0.053) 
Exchange 
   0.123** (0.054) 
0.117** 
(0.055) 
Portfolio size 0.098***
(0.034) 
0.099***
(0.034) 
0.099*** 
(0.034) 
0.081** 
(0.035) 
0.072** 
(0.055) 
No of observations 425 425 425 425 425 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-666 -665 -664 -664 -661 
Note: Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different 
from zero at the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level. The regressions contain dummies for five technology 
classes and for four categories of company age. 
In the model in column (6), we use the dummy approach in order to find out whether 
companies following a certain patent strategy have a higher likelihood of oppositions in 
their patent portfolios. We find no significantly higher share of oppositions among 
companies using patents for defensively blocking competitors compared to companies 
using patents in their originally intended sense. However, we can confirm that offensive 
blocking has a positive, but weakly significant effect. In model (6) we find strong sup-
port for our hypothesis 2c) that companies which favour the exchange strategy face less 
opposition than companies that use patents mainly to protect their inventions. 
Companies employing patents as bartering chips in licensing arrangements or co-
operations have a similar share of oppositions as those using patents for protection pur-
poses. In the dummy model (column 6), we find even that this type of company has sig-
nificantly lower shares of oppositions. This corresponds exactly to our argument that 
18 
 those companies are not interested in conflicts with potential collaboration partners due 
to possible damage to their overall reputation in the market for technology and that pos-
sible patent conflicts may be resolved informally without formal opposition processes.  
Table 6: Tobit Regressions Explaining Share of Oppositions 
(Marginal Effects) 
Share of Opposition 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Imitation protection 0.007** 
(0.004) 
   0.004 
(0.004) 
 
Defensive blocking  0.001 
(0.026) 
  -0.002 
(0.004) 
 
Offensive blocking   0.007** 
(0.003) 
 0.006* 
(0.003) 
 
Exchange    0.002 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
 
Dummy defensive 
blocking company 
     -0.004 
(0.006) 
Dummy offensive 
blocking company 
     0.002* 
(0.009) 
Dummy exchange 
company 
     -0.022**
(0.007) 
Citations 0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.020***
(0.006) 
0.020***
(0.006) 
0.020***
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
0.019***
(0.006) 
Portfolio size 0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.008***
(0.002) 
0.008***
(0.016) 
0.008***
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.008***
(0.002) 
No of observations 457 457 457 457 457 457 
Log pseudo-
likelihood -11.4 -13.0 -10.1 -12.9 -9.4 -11.7 
Note: Marginal effects and their robust standard errors are reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, 1% significance level. The regressions contain dummies for five technology classes and for 
four categories of company age. 
We consider that the incidence of opposition is highly correlated with the value of the 
patented innovation but that the interpretation of this strategic instrument is complex. 
For this reason we included the citation measure as a control for the average value of 
patents in a portfolio. The coefficients of the motives then capture the impact on the 
strategic use of opposition as an indicator of dispute, not of value. In all six regression 
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 models both the citations and the portfolio size have a significant positive influence on 
the share of oppositions. More valuable patents clearly create stronger incentives for 
oppositions and larger players also face a positive scale effect in receiving oppositions.8  
Interpreting the regression results to explain the share of oppositions, we come to the 
following conclusions. Offensive blocking strategies provoke significantly more opposi-
tions, whereas the impact of defensive blocking is no different than that of just using 
patents to protect the current technological portfolio. The rather weak support for our 
hypothesis, that blocking strategies have a positive influence on the share of opposi-
tions, can explained by a further link we have proved in the regressions related to the 
citations. Here we argue and find the empirical evidence that the traditional use of pat-
ents to protect the technological base leads to patents of rather high value compared to 
the patents generated under a blocking strategy. The regressions explaining the shares of 
oppositions show a very strong explanatory power of the number of citations. Conse-
quently, those companies utilising patents to protect their own technological know-how 
receive not only a higher number of citations, but also of oppositions. This effect re-
duces the difference to the pure opposition-provoking effect of companies that employ 
patents in their blocking strategies. This explains the rather low explanatory power of 
these variables, i.e. only offensive blocking is positively significantly correlated with 
the share of oppositions.  
The companies using patents for exchange motives receive a smaller number of opposi-
tions than those just using them for protecting objectives. Obviously, this company type 
intends to follow a protection strategy causing relatively little conflicts, since the nega-
tive reputation effect is much more severe and long-lasting in the whole market in 
which the company is active, compared to the gains of pursuing one specific patent 
claim against a possible competitor or collaboration partner. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper analyses for the first time how strategic motives for patenting are related to 
the characteristics of companies’ patent portfolios. Using a data set of more than 400 
companies we find – based on different regression approaches – that strategic patenting 
has an influence on the companies’ patent portfolios.  
                                                 
8 See also Harhoff and Reitzig (2004).  
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 First, companies that use patents to protect their technological base and their markets 
receive a higher number of citations compared to those that use patents to block com-
petitors or as bartering chips in collaborations with licensing relations. This finding con-
firms our first hypothesis. However, it should be noted that there is a difference between 
the patent portfolios of companies using patents for defensive blocking, i.e. securing 
their own future technological space, and applying patents to offensively block competi-
tors. The latter receive a significantly lower number of citations.  
Second, companies using patents to offensively block competitors receive – as postu-
lated in our second hypothesis – a higher share of oppositions to their portfolios. There 
is no significant relationship between the defensive use of patents and the opposition 
indicator. A further hypothesis is also confirmed since companies using patents in ex-
change relations with licensees or licensors face a smaller share of opposition than those 
companies using patents merely for protection purposes.  
These new insights make important contributions to the discussion on strategic patent-
ing. Since we find considerable closeness between the traditional protection motive and 
the defensive blocking strategy, but significant differences between the latter and offen-
sive blocking, we have to interpret defensive blocking as a kind of forward-oriented 
traditional protection strategy, which can therefore be subsumed into the traditional mo-
tive. Very different is offensive blocking of competitors by means of patents, which is 
clearly a case of the patent system being used for a purpose other than that for which it 
was originally intended. Although using patents as bartering chips in collaborations 
does not lead to patents of higher, but of lower quality, this motive has the positive side-
effect of avoiding conflicts in the opposition phase and looking for more informal and 
therefore more efficient conflict solution mechanisms. In summary, offensive blocking 
is the most critical and costly strategic patent motive from the perspective of the patent-
ing authorities. 
Based on these findings we can derive the following policy implications. First, the mar-
kets for technology are clearly quite efficient, since companies using patents as barter-
ing chips possess patent portfolios with similar characteristics. It must also be noted that 
this type of company generally tries to follow a patenting strategy which does not cause 
severe conflicts with possible collaboration partners. This additional pressure to secure 
its reputation is a positive force for conflict resolution. Second, the phenomenon of fre-
quent oppositions and rather limited citations in a company's patent portfolio is an inci-
dence that the company is implementing an offensive blocking strategy and thus misus-
ing the patent system. This is a potential information source, which could be used in 
investigations of anti-competitive behaviour in specific markets or by single companies. 
In summary, this investigation has confirmed the validity and the usability of patent 
portfolio characteristics not only for innovation management, but also policy issues. 
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